Small Countries and International Trade by Auten, John H.
SMALL COUNTRIES AND I[NTERNATIONAL TRADE 
T HE position of small countries in the international econ- omy is an interesting one. Countries like Denmark, New 
Zealand, and Switzerland achieve high levels of real income 
based in large measure upon the opportunity for interna- 
tional trade and specialization. On the other hand, these 
small countries do find their economic fortunes very respon- 
sive to conditions in world markets. In the case of the coun- 
tries mentioned more than twenty per cent of their national 
income is accounted for by export sales. A high ratio of ex- 
port revenue to national income is important to the small 
country from the standpoint of the business cycle. For the 
sake of brevity we simply term this cyclical dependence. 
Along with this sensitivity to external demand goes concen- 
tration upon a very few commodities for sale in world 
markets. For example, in New Zealand approximately ninety 
per cent of export revenue is regularly derived from the over- 
seas sale of four commodities (butter, cheese, meat, and 
wool) and, for practical purposes, these exports are the prod- 
uct of just two industries. The New Zealand situation is not 
an unusual one; in fact, other small countries have carried 
their specialization to the point where overseas income is 
largely derived from sales of a single product. Such extreme 
degrees of specialization add an element of uncertainty to 
future prospects. If a new product or process slashes the 
demand for the small country's export specialty, a serious 
problem of readjustment can arise. In some instances a sub- 
stitute export fills the gap, e.g,, the case of Chilean copper 
exports following the 1918 war and an abrupt fall in the de- 
mand for nitrates. However, the process of readjustment is 
not necessarily quick or easy. 
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I t  should be noted that the concentration upon a few com- 
modities for sale in world markets is slightly difEerent in its 
implications from cyclical dependence. Suppose that, in the 
future, wool-exporting nations will face a serious threat in 
the form of synthetic substitutes. This need bear no unique 
relationship to cyclical ups and downs but will be associated 
with technological change and an altered structure of world 
trade. Since forces which alter the basic structure of trade 
in this fashion should be isolated from the cyclical ebb and 
flow of business activity, the risk of catastrophic changes in 
the demand for export specialties will be said to involve the 
threat of product dependence. 
There is another feature of the small economy's position 
that deserves emphasis. This third feature goes beyond the 
economic phenomena of a high ratio of export receipts to 
national income and a high degree of export specialization. 
Even if the international economy is not ruled by the law of 
the jungle, the exercise of national power across political 
boundaries is not unknown. Small countries have, at times, 
been at some disadvantage in dealing with their larger 
neighbors in situations where national power was an end and 
trading relationships a means to that end. Aggrandizement 
of power for the large countly can involve drawing the small 
nation within the larger nation's economic orbit, thereby en- 
couraging an integration of the small country with its more 
powerful neighbor, This integration is likely to leave the 
smaller country extremely dependent upon a continuance 
of the relationship, for the very integration of the small 
country's structure of production with the requirements of 
its larger trading partner leaves the small country with other 
alternatives reduced by the exclusive arrangement. In some 
instances the exclusive arrangements are very obviously in- 
struments of economic warfare and indicative of an economic 
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penetration of a weaker nation, e.g., Nazi Germany and the 
Balkan states. In other instances the predatory aspects of 
the process are absent and the integration of the smaller 
economy with the larger economy proceeds by mutual choice, 
e.g., England of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and 
some members of the British Commonwealth. I t  is probable 
that results are a more objective guide than motives or tech- 
niques, and any integration of a small nation's economy with 
that of a larger nation should be considered evidence of cul- 
tural dependence. The extra-economic emphasis is deliberate, 
since the effects of this integration are pervasive and do tend 
to give rise to a measure of cultural penetration whether de- 
liberate or unplanned. 
Each of these three types of dependence (cyclical, product, 
and cultural) is important for the small economy-or is, at 
least, of potential importance for the small economy. It is 
probable, however, that no two small countries would be 
concerned with these types of dependence in the same de- 
gree, The category of small nations, including, as it does, 
countries at such diverse stages of economic development 
as Belgium and Guatemala, is a broad one. Considerable 
caution is indicated in applying any conclusions drawn from 
a general analysis of the small country situation to the posi- 
tion of an individual small nation. 
Prior to a discussion of the three types of dependence, a 
digression of some length is desirable. I t  must be emphasized 
that in the digression to follow we shall proceed on the fol- 
lowing assumptions : 
(a) that cyclical income fluctuations are absent or unim- 
portant, 
(b) that risks of specialization are absent, 
(c) that the exercise of national power can be ignored since 
only the pursuit of economic gain by private traders is 
a t  issue. 
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These assumptions simply exclude factors that have previ- 
ously been classified as involving cyclical, product, and cul- 
tural dependence and that are to be considered separately. 
The classical and neo-classical theories of international 
trade paid direct, if fleeting, attention to the position of the 
small country. The conclusion reached was optimistic in the 
extreme, since it was held that the small nation trading with 
a larger partner could actually receive all the gain from trade. 
Such a conclusion might not seem to be compatible with the 
remarks made here on the dependent and vulnerable posi- 
tion of the small economy. However, the effort here will not 
be to discredit the conclusion that the small country m y  
reap large gains from international trade, but rather to indi- 
cate that the theoretical anaIysis has often been based on 
restrictive assumptions. Our quarrel is not with the logic of 
the argument, given its assumptions, but with the universal 
relevance of the assumptions. 
In approaching the "small country case" as it was devel- 
oped in economic writings of the last century, some historical 
perspective is essential. Theorists of the classical and neo- 
classical schools wrote during a period when 19th century 
liberalism was in the ascendancy. The era of mercantilism 
with its extensive state regulation of trade was drawing to a 
close. I t  was then possibh to speak more reaIisticaUy of 
foreign trade as involving exchange between very large num- 
bers of private traders operating over, but relatively un- 
hampered by, international boundaries. In this context the 
classical writers developed a theory of international values 
that looked to the rational pursuit of self-interest on the part 
of private traders as the motivating force. Principles of spe- 
Small Countries and International Trade 5 
cialization early viewed as valid for the national economy 
were extended to the international economy. Specialization 
in accordance with the dictates of an impersonal market 
mechanism was viewed as insuring maximum world produc- 
tion. Although the fact is not always understood, the better 
19th century writers did not assert that free trade would 
maximize economic welfare for each country, The correct 
neo-classical presumption was that non-interference with de- 
veloping specialization tended to sponsor a world-wide eco- 
nomic allocation of resources.' It was never denied (by the 
more sophisticated) that an individual nation might gain by 
restrictive practices; but it was held that this gain was at the 
expense of the nations offended against and, of course, that 
retaliation could furher restrict the benefits of international 
specialization. 
In terms of trade and welfare the pure theory of interna- 
tional trade of the 19th century addressed itself to the re- 
lated issues of a possible gain from international trade and 
the division of that gain or surplus among trading nations. 
The first issue-that of a gain from international trade-was 
clearly expressed by David Ricardo. It will be recalled that 
Ricardo's contribution to international value theory stressed 
the importance of comparative labor costs. The classic ex- 
ample of Portugal and England specializing in wine and 
cloth production involved gain for both nations, although 
(in Ricardo's example) Portugal's inputs of labor-time per 
unit of output were lower in both pursuits. The second issue 
-that of the division of gain from international trade-was 
not developed by Ricardo. In  the illustration of Portugal 
and England trading in wine and cloth, Ricardo selected a 
possible ratio at  which the products might be exchanged 
but did not explain the forces that determined the actual 
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post-trade barter ratio. Ricardo may have subdued the issue 
of a division of gain from trade because of the labor theory 
of value employed in his analysis. In  the very first sentence 
of his chapter on foreign trade Ricardo stated his position in 
these terms: 
NO extension of foreign trade will immediately increase 
the amount of value in a country, although it will very power- 
fully contribute to increase the mass of commodities, and 
therefore the sum of enjoyments.' 
The labor theory of value upon which Ricardo built was in- 
compatible with a direct increase in value stemming from 
trade between countries. With labor (and capital) assumed to 
be mobile domestically and immobile internationally, foreign 
trade involved not an increase in value measured in terms of 
labor time but, as Ricardo put it, foreign trade involved an 
increase in "the mass of commodities and therefore the sum 
of enjoyments," Thus, for Ricardo, gain from foreign trade 
would have rested upon a different theory of value from that 
which he applied to domestic trade, and this, perhaps, ex- 
plains his seeming lack of interest in the division of subjec- 
tive gain among nations-or, more properly, division among 
individuals in the trading nations. 
It was left for John Stuart Mill to indicate the factors that 
determined the actual barter ratio of exchange which would 
ruIe in international markets. Mill's contribution was one of 
explaining the terms upon which trade would be conducted 
between two countries, i.e., the quantity of home goods that 
would exchange for foreign goods in an equilibrium situa- 
tion. Aimed with the concept of demand as a schedule of 
quantities which would be taken at  various barter ratios, 
MiIl suggested that the precise terms upon which trade 
would be conducted depended upon the character of each 
country's demand for the goods of the other. While it was 
Small Countries and International Trade '7 
left for Alfsed Marshall to provide geometrical embellish- 
ments and stability conditions for an unique eq~ilibrium,~ 
Mill's contribution was substantial. 
The stress laid upon reciprocal demands in Mill's analysis 
represented a shift away from the Ricardian emphasis upon 
comparative labor costs. Modern treatments of the theory 
of international prices proceed in a general equilibrium 
framework and would not accord independent influence to 
either demand or cost factors, But so long as the analysis 
ran in terms of constant comparative costs and reciprocal de- 
mands, it was possible for 19th century theorists to subordi- 
nate the influence of cost factors. It could then be asserted 
that the influence of comparative costs was exhausted in 
setting the limits to profitable exchange and that forces of 
demand determined the barter ratio of exchange and the 
division of gain from trade. Such a treatment can reduce the 
problem of international values to an equivalent level with 
that of exchange between two individuals each of whom 
possesses beginning stocks of two commodities and barters 
so as to achieve a most desired consumption menu. The un- 
satisfactory nature of this treatment did not escape the notice 
of later 19th century theorists. The case of a small country 
trading wit11 a larger country was adduced as a special case 
where the forces of reciprocaI demand were ineffective in 
setting the barter ratios4 
With the opening of trade between two countries of simi- 
lar productive capacity ally difference in comparative costs 
would commence a shift of resources in each country into 
the line of comparative advantage. If this resource diversion 
were to continue until each of the nations was completely 
specialized, reciprocal demands would determine the barter 
ratio between the nations. Complete and simultaneous spe- 
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cialization would allow the problem to be redaced to one of 
pure exchange. But if one country were large and the other 
small, the small nation could become completely specialized 
while the larger nation produced some of both commodities 
(in a two-country model). This would involve the small nation 
trading at the cost limit of its larger neighbor and achieving 
all the gain from trade. In this special case the large nation 
achieves no gain since its consumption menu is the same be- 
fore and after trade. The only changes in the large country 
occur on the side of production. More of one commodity and 
less of another will be produced at  home. Consumption is un- 
changed. 
A geometrical treatment may emphasize the failure of 
reciprocal demands to set the terms of trade in the special 
case of trade between a smaI1 country and a large Some 
preliminary steps are unavoidable. First the technique will 
be applied to the "normal" case of trade between countries 
of similar size. Adhering to Mill's assumptions of bilateral 
trade in only two commodities, it is assumed that two coun- 
tries of similar size (A and B) produce two commodities (X 
and Y) at constant cost. Suppose that the relative costs of 
producing X and Y at home differ as between country A and 
country B. In such a case trade is possible and will encourage 
specialization in each country upon one of the commodities. 
It is further assumed that country A is relatively more effi- 
cient in the production of X while country B's advantage lies 
in the production of Y. Figure I pictures such a situation. 
Amounts of X goods that will be exported by country A at 
various barter ratios are measured along the horizontal axis. 
Amounts of Y goods that will be exported by country B at 
various barter ratios are measured along the vertical axis. 
The slopes of OCF and ODE represent the (constant) cost 
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ratios of production for commodities X and Y in countries 
A and B respectively. The reciprocal demand schedules (ODG 
and OCH) for each country are linear to the amount of pre- 
trade production (and consumption) of commodity Y for 
country A and commodity X for country B. This construction 
allows for the possibility that the countries would be indif- 
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ing costs of transport) at the pre-trade barter ratio.6 When 
this critical point is passed the reciprocal demand schedules 
are curvilinear. 
As drawn, Figure I implies a unique equilibrium with OP 
of A goods exchanged for OQ of B goods. The one barter 
ratio which will clear the market is given by the slope of the 
line OM to the intersection of the reciprocal demand sched- 
ules ODG and OCH. In terms of Figure I the (constant) cost 
ratios for the countries (ODE and OCF) define a region 
within which possible barter ratios must lie; and the shape 
of the reciprocal demand schedules (ODG and OCH) deter- 
- 
mines the equilibrium terms of exchange. Ricardo would have 
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suggested that trade would take place at some barter ratio 
between the cost limits. Mill suggested that the ratio would 
be determined by the forces of reciprocal demand. 
The case of a snlall nation trading with a large nation may 
be handled in the same fashion. The only change is one of 
pre-trade productive capacity. In Figure I1 the linear seg- 
ments of the reciprocal demand schedules (coincident with 
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FIGURE I1
the domestic cost ratios) have been constructed so as to be 
of unequal length. The large country (L) is equipped with 
a linear segment OC implying OF of X as pre-trade home 
production (and consumption) of that commodity. The small 
country (S) is equipped with a linear segment OA implying 
OE of Y as pre-trade home production (and consunlption) of 
that commodity. The curvilinear segments AB and CD are 
once again based upon individual preferences in countries S 
and L respectively. As drawn, Figure I1 implies a unique 
equilibrium at  point I with OG of L exports of commodity 
Y exchanging for OH of S exports of commodity X. In this 
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special case the post-trade barter ratio and the pre-trade 
cost ratio in country L are identical in equilibrium. Experi- 
mentation with barter ratios drawn clockwise from OC will 
reveal that no other barter ratio will equate the offers of the 
two countries. 
Now the alleged failure of reciprocal demands to deter- 
mine the equilibrium barter ratio in the small country case 
may be examined. Superficially it appears that the treatment 
in Figure I1 differs in no very important respect from that 
of Figure I. However, in drawing the schedules with a linear 
segment, implicit account has been taken of changes on the 
side of production. In order to isolate the influence of de- 
mand, a case of pure exchange7 will be considered for trade 
between two countries of similar size and for the special case 
of trade between a large and a small nation. 
The derivation of the reciprocal demand schedules or 
offer curves can be described brieffy. In Figure I11 which 
applies to one of the countries, amounts of commodity X are 
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measured along the abscissa and amounts of commodity Y 
are measured along the ordinate. A family of contour lines 
is drawn in the XY plane. These contours are subject to the 
following interpretation. The community is said to be indif- 
ferent to any combination of commodities along a single 
contour line, say, RR'. A position upon any higher contour 
involves a movement to a more preferred po~it ion.~ The com- 
munity possesses a beginning stock of commodities X and 
Y. In Figure 111, point A on contour SS' is the community's 
original position-a stock composed of OM of Y and ON of 
X. With the opportunity for exchange the community is 
faced with different barter ratios of exchange. These different 
trading ratios are described by a family of lines pivoting on 
point A. As the exchange lines pivot in a clockwise direction 
(a relative fall in the price of Y) the community may move to 
a more preferred position. With a given price ratio, tangency 
of an exchange line with a contour insures that the most pre- 
ferred position has been achieved. Successive barter ratios 
trace out a series of these points (A, B, C, and D of Figure 
III).Vlle offer curve for the community is simply the locus 
of all possible points of tangency. A smooth curve has been 
drawn through points A, B, C, and D of Figure I11 implying 
successive tangencies with undrawn contours. 
A similar interpretation may be given to the offer curve 
for the other country.'O Now with both offer curves derived, 
they can be plotted on a single set of coordinates. Figure IV 
sets out two conventionally-shaped offer curves for countries 
of similar size. The diagram only differs from that of Figure I 
in that offer curves for both countries (in Figure IV) are curvi- 
linear from the origin.'l Suppose that an attempt were made 
to parallel the treatment of Figure IV in the case where both 
countries are not of equaI size. Instead of a diagram similar to 
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that of Figure IV, it is clear that only the small country's 
offer curve could be derived. The large country's offer curve 
degenerates to a single point-the origin-representing the 
consumption menu before and after trade in the large coun- 
try. It is true that the shape of the small country's offer curve 
determines the degree of specialization in the large country; 
but if the small country case is involved the barter ratio of 
exchange is set independently of the influence of demand. 
The "failure" of reciprocal demand analysis in the small 
country case was, of course, symptomatic of the inadequacy 
of any approach to international values more restrictive than 
one of general equilibrium. I t  is beyond the scope of the pres- 
ent discussion to indicate successive refinements in the neo- 
classical position, e.g., the extension of the analysis to trade 
between many countries in many commodities and the 
abandonment of the unrealistic constant cost as~umption.'~ 
Instead it is proposed that an effort be made to summarize 
briefly the conditions required for large gains by small 
nations. 
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Gains from trade stem from the opportunity for exchange 
in the face of relative price differences at honie and abroad. 
Ignoring transport costs, trade establishes in equilibrium a 
new, common set of relative prices. Large gains for the small 
nation are contingent upon two factors. First, the small na- 
tion must find the post-trade equilibrium relative price set 
coincident with (or very close to) that which would rule if 
the small nation did not, in fact, trade with the rest of the 
world. If a Iarge, previously isolated, nation were to open 
trade with the rest of the world, it would likely exert a sub- 
stantial effect upon relative prices. But the small nation may 
be favorably situated because of its insignificance. The lirnit- 
ing case is simply one where the small nation's influence on 
relative prices is literally zero and where all gain accrues to 
the small nation.13 There is, however, a second factor upon 
which a large gain by the small nation is contingent. While 
a minor influence upon relative prices is necessary for a large 
gain, it is not sufficient. For example, the small nation might 
be as small as one likes, but if its set of relative prices in the 
absence of trade happened to coincide with the set ruling 
in the rest of the world, no trade would be possible and, of 
course, no gain from trade would result. A large gain requires 
a wide divergence between relative prices at home and abroad 
(without trade) in addition to the privilege of trading at 
world prices without disturbing them in appreciable fashion. 
I t  is tempting to reduce the divergence of relative prices 
to one of differences in factor endowment and production 
possibilities. Then it could be said that the small country 
with very skewed resources is likely to achieve the most sub- 
stantial gains. One difficulty is invoIved since this conclusion 
rests upon an implicit assumption as to a degree of similarity 
in tastes and preferences between countries. A small nation 
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might be prodigiously efficient in the cultivation of bananas, 
but capable of little else in the way of efficient production. 
Should the preferences of the community subscribe to a 
rather monotonous consumption menu, it is possible that no 
very profitable avenues for gain through international trade 
would exist. But should the community's tastes extend to 
washing machines and radios, it is likely that international 
trade would involve very substantial gains. 
The conclusion that small countries are large gainers is, 
after all, most convincing when one reflects that the small 
nation tends to achieve through international trade what a 
more sizable nation would very largely achieve through inter- 
regional trade. Specialization upon a narrow range of prod- 
ucts for exchange in world markets enables individuals in 
the small nation to enjoy a diversified consumption menu, It 
will now be contended here, however, that there are peculi- 
arities in the small-country position that require some dis- 
counting of these potential gains. 
This section will concentrate upon the small-country posi- 
tion in a world economy that experiences fluctuations in in- 
come and output, Fluctuations in income and output do 
occur and a veiy modest development of the small-country 
position will be sufficient to establish that these disturbances 
are of particular importance for the small nation. I t  has been 
suggested that a high ratio of export revenue to national in- 
come is indicative of cyclical dependence. At the very least 
cyclical dependence carries with it two undesirable effects. 
These are: first, a very high degree of sensitivity to income 
fluctuations external to the home economy; and, second, a 
very low degree of freedom with respect to domestic policy 
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measures designed to offset externally-induced income move- 
ments. The discussion to follow develops these propositions 
and indicates their relevance for the small country. 
Some preliminary attention must be given to the inter- 
national transmission of income fluctuations. The treatment 
will be perfunctory and no distinction will be drawn between 
real and money income. From the standpoint of income de- 
termination, an open economy differs from a closed one in 
that some part of expenditure upon home-produced goods 
and services, and hence some part of home income, does not 
arise domestically. In the open economy a stream of expen- 
ditures upon export goods comes from abroad. Consequently, 
home exports are a function of foreign income. The other 
link with the outside world is, of course, the stream of home 
expenditures that is directed upon foreign goods. Imports 
are a function of home income. Any open economy finds that 
home income depends upon foreign income through the 
channel of export sales, and correspondingly that some in- 
fluence is exerted upon foreign income through the channel 
of import purchases. Suppose that home income has found a 
steady level and then that foreign incomes fall. Initially at 
home only export sales and exporters' incomes will suffer, 
but the income decline will filter through the domestic econ- 
omy as expenditures and incomes are reduced. It can be 
shown that with a given fall in foreign income, and there- 
fore in export sales, home income will usually find a new 
(but lower) level. In other words, the foreign-induced de- 
cline in home income does not continue forever, but is braked 
by factors that arrest the cumulative decline. These "braking 
factors" are induced reductions in savings and in import 
purchases. 
Let us take the first undesirable feature of cyclical de- 
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pendence, i.e., a high degree of sensitivity to income move- 
ments external to the home economy. A decline in foreign 
income is postulated. If countries were of similar size and 
- 
foreign trade were of equivalent importance to each country, 
then absolute changes in income would be of interest. But 
in the more general case, it is obvious that relative changes 
in income must be used, i.e., a ten per cent fall in home 
income rather than a fall of "x" million francs. The relative 
fall in home income for a given change in foreign income can 
be shown to depend upon these effects: 
1. The percentage cut in home exports caused by a given 
percentage fall in foreign income. 
2. The percentage fa11 in home income that resuIts from the 
percentage fall in home exports. 
If the small nation actually does tend to show a higher sensi- 
tivity of home income to changes in foreign income, the rea- 
son is to be found in one, or both, of these two effects. The 
reason is not to be found in the first effect. At constant prices, 
the percentage fall in home exports will simply depend upon 
the foreign income elasticity of demand for imports from the 
small country. It is quite true that some small countries are 
unfavorably situated because of the type of exports they sell 
in world markets. In times of depression, Ceylon may experi- 
ence a more sizable decline in export revenue than will New 
Zealand; but cyclical sensitivity of exports is not the exclu- 
sive property of small nations. Small countries will differ 
among themselves in sensitivity to foreign income changes, 
but we are in search of a factor which explains greater sensi- 
tivity for small nations than for large nations. 
The unique feature of the small-country position is to be 
found in the fact that, given a percentage fall in export re- 
ceipts (not uniform for all small countries with a given change 
in world income), pressures are set up for a very sizable per- 
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centage fall in home income. The argument can be condensed 
somewhat if we introduce the following symbols: 
Let Y = the beginning level of home income, 
and E = the beginning level of home export sales. 
AY AE Then - and - may stand for the percentage change 
Y E 
in home income and exports. Whatever the quantitative re- 




a- where "a" simply insures the equality. In this 
Y E 
form the equation is a truism. Any tendency for the small 
nation to experience a large percentage change in home in- 
come for a given percentage change in exports must occasion 
a large coefficient (a). This is not helpful unless a can be ex- 
pressed in familiar terms. A rearrangement of the expression 
AY E yields a = - - -. In  this form a is seen to depend upon 
AE Y 
the muItipIier for a foreign induced change in export re- 
ceipts, and the beginning ratio of exports to home income.'" 
E 
The second factor - is sure to be large for the smalI country. 
Y 
In suggesting a t  the beginning of this paper that a high ratio 
of export proceeds to home income was indicative of cyclical 
dependence, no attention was given to the probable size of 
the multiplier term for the small country. Actually a moder- 
ately low multiplier might be expected on the grounds that 
the quantitative size of the multiplier depends inversely 
upon the marginal propensities to save and to import. The 
small country will typically increase or reduce its import 
outlay substantially with a given change in income, i.e., the 
marginal propensity to import will be high. No dogmatic 
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judgment can safely be expressed as to the probable size of 
the marginal propensity to save as between large countries 
and small. Probably the stage of economic development is 
a greater determining factor than the size of a country in 
this connection. It would seem, then, that the two terns (the 
multiplier and export-income ratio) work in opposite direc- 
tions for the small country. We may be sure, however, that 
the range of variation for the multipIier will be fairly nar- 
row. Consequently it is the large export-income ratio, in the 
case of the small country, that is conducive to the magnifica- 
tion of any fluctuation in external demand. 
The second undesirable feature of cyclical dependence is 
simply that the small nation is severely handicapped in its 
efforts to avoid the full impact of changes in external de- 
mand. It is clear that world-wide income movements are 
not generated in the small country. The small country may 
experience the widest extremes of prosperity and depression 
without more than incidental disturbance to the rest of the 
world. Any income fluctuation in major trading countries, 
on the other hand, will exert a large effect upon the small 
nation. A reasonable proposal might be that the small nation 
should attempt to offset some of the deflationary (or infla- 
tionary) pressure from abroad through domestic policy meas- 
ures. But notice that the small-country position is one in 
which any change in donlestic expenditure is very quickly 
and sizably reflected into its external accounts. The small 
nation that undertakes an extensive program of public ex- 
penditure in a depression wiIl End that a considerable amount 
of this expenditure leaks away in the form of increased im- 
ports from the rest of the world. As one writer has put the 
matter, "It is trying to heat the house in winter when one is 
unable to close the doors and windows."15 The analogy is 
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an entirely proper one, for the benefit derived by the rest 
of the world is insignificant. The appropriate remedy is quite 
apparent. The major trading nations that have suffered in- 
come declines and developed "favorable" balances of pay- 
ments should take steps to increase the level of home ex- 
penditures. As home incomes increase, purchases from abroad 
increase, wiping out the trade deficits abroad and raising 
incomes abroad. The large nation may cast its bread upon 
the waters with some confidence since the repercussive 
effects will be beneficial as foreign incomes rise. The ability 
of the small nation to inflate the rest of the world is, of 
course, negligible. In a stable international economy these 
effects would be unimportant, and "the more sinned against" 
interpretation of the small country's Tot would be improper. 
But in an international economy in which the transmission 
of depression and inflation is common, the small country may 
see merit in policies that reduce its degree of cyclical de- 
pendence, even though the policy measures involve some 
sacrifice of the undoubted gains of international speciliza- 
tion. 
International trade theory suggests that gains from trade 
may be greatest where a very few export commodities ex- 
change for a much wider range of imported items. I t  will 
be recalled that the "small-country case" involved the small 
country completely specialized. With the extension of the 
analysis to the case of multilateral trade in many commodi- 
ties, the likelihood is lessened that the small country will 
specialize to the extent of concentrating upon a single ex- 
port, but the probability is not removed that where the 
small nation achieves large gains it does so by exporting a 
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very narrow range of items, perhaps even a single product. 
In the theoretical literatwe, references to the gains from 
specialization are far more common than references to the 
risks and uncertainties involved. This is understandable but 
should not lead one to conclude that, in reality, the risks 
of specialization are non-existent. While the case for special- 
ization to achieve high levels of real income is a strong one, 
it should not receive unquestioned application. 
Specialization involves resource allocation in accordance 
with a set of relative prices. Where the relative prices are 
determined competitively, there is some justification for 
presuming that an economic allocation of resources has been 
achieved. For the small nation the allocation may be very 
largely determined by a given set of world prices, The ques- 
tion immediately arises as to whether the small nation might 
not become "artificially specialized'" where it traded at a set 
of relative prices which, far from being determined imper- 
sonally, were set by a more powerful nation (or group of 
nations) for the express purpose of inducing in the small 
nation an allocation of resources that would contribute to 
the power potential of the larger entity, e.g., fostering a de- 
pendent nation's specialization upon critical raw materials 
through the medium of very favorable terms of trade. The 
possibility is not too remote for consideration, but is more 
properly treated in the discussion of cultural dependence. 
For now it will be assumed that whatever specialization is 
induced in the small nation by international trade, that spe- 
cialization results from economic forces. 
Given a set of world relative prices external to the small 
economy, international trade will effect a certain distribution 
of small-country resources after trade. This resource alloca- 
tion is likely to involve a much higher degree of export spe- 
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cialization in the small economy than would be involved in 
the case of a larger nation. From a purely static point of view 
this specialization need be of no particular concern since 
small-country concentration upon a very few export com- 
modities is evidence of large gains from trade. It is worthy 
of note, however, that a high degree of specialization and 
large gains from trade can mean a large loss from the in- 
terruption or disturbance of trade. Along these lines it has 
been pointed out that gain from trade could even serve as 
a measure of the influence that might be exerted upon a 
small nation.'' This view is a useful one where consideratioils 
of national power are relevant. The view can also be applied 
where the exercise of national power is not at  issue but where 
economic risk and uncertainty are involved. In such a case a 
large gain from trade implying a large loss from its interrup- 
tion testifies to the vulnerability of the small nation to any 
changes in relative prices that affect its own export special- 
ties in drastic fashion. Such a change might arise from the 
side of demand in the form of a shift in consumer preferences, 
or such a change might arise from the side of supply in the 
form of a new product or process competitive with the small 
country's exports. In any event the small nation is faced (as 
are other nations) with the probability that once a certain 
degree of export specialization is achieved a t  home under 
the direction of relative prices, some future change in the 
basic data that determined the equilibrium price set will 
compel a change in the allocation of domestic resources, 
Now the prospect of adaptation to change can, under cer- 
tain circumstances, be an unattractive one. I t  will be urged 
that the position of the small country is such that some atten- 
tion must inevitably be given to possible future changes in 
demand or supply that would require either a sharp fall in 
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real income, or a resource shift of large magnitude, or some 
combination of both. One point must be stressed. From the 
standpoint of comparative statics, i.e., the comparison of two 
equilibrium positions, one before and the other after a 
change in the basic data, the adaptations on the part of the 
small nation are necessary and unavoidable if an economic 
allocation of resources is to be achieved and maintained. 
Our point is simply that the small country should be particu- 
larly interested in the probable course of adjustment and in 
the prospect for policy measures designed to ease transi- 
tional adjustments. 
The threat to small-country real income is made acute by 
two factors. First, concentration upon a few exports means 
that a sharp decline in the price of an exported item will 
initially occasion a substantial fall in real income. For present 
purposes the argument will not depend upon the suscepti- 
bility of certain exports to competition,17 but will be made to 
rest upon a much simpler proposition. Fewness of exports 
coupled with a high ratio of export revenue to national in- 
come insures that decreased revenue from a single export 
commodity initially involves a substantial reduction in home 
income." For example, suppose that a small country exports 
only two commodities, perhaps copper and wheat, but that 
the ratio of export revenue to national income is high, say 
thirty per cent. Another larger country exports ten com- 
modities (copper, wheat, and eight others), but the ratio of 
export revenue to national income is low, say ten per cent. A 
sharp fall in world demand for wheat (or copper) will face 
the small nation with a much more substantial fall in real 
income than it would for the large nation. The small nation's 
degree of external orientation renders it very susceptible to 
changes in world demand (or supply). On the other hand, 
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a larger (more diversified) economy can more easily tolerate 
a reduction in home income from displacement of a single 
export since the effect upon domestic standards of living will 
be of smaller proportions. 
The second factor arising from a high degree of export 
specialization is not limited to the initial impact of a change 
in the conditions of world demand and supply, but refers 
to the possible resource shifts that follow the collapse of an 
external market and make possible the achievement of a new 
equilibrium position. The small-country problem is one of 
limited alternatives and a low degree of resource mobility. 
For the sake of illustration, let us take the extreme case 
of a small nation which, when faced with a certain set of 
relative p-rices, has specialized to the extent of producing a 
single commodity for export and sale in world markets. 
Naturally some other commodities and services will still be 
produced at home since at any set of relative prices there 
are items that will not move at all readily in international 
commerce, e.g., cement and haircuts. But, by and large, the 
small country's structure of production will reflect its ex- 
port specialization with a considerable number of domestic 
industries ancillary to the export industry. Now, if one takes 
the gloomiest view possible and presumes that world de- 
mand for the export specialty is completely wiped out, real 
income for the small country will not only suffer a very 
drastic cut but will stay at low levels for some length of time. 
The very degree of export specialization is likely to have en- 
couraged the development of specialized skills, techniques, 
and equipment.19 Where factors of production are quite 
specific, it may be expected that sharp falls in their return 
wiU leave them stranded. The point is that the single-product 
economy will in complete specialization have reduced its 
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own alternatives. Faced with the necessity of shifting re- 
sources to alternative pursuits, the small country may find 
that feasible alternatives are not immediately available. 
The net effect of the fact that small-nation income is 
bound up with the fortunes of a few exports and that the 
domestic possibilities of shifting resources to new pursuits 
may be limited by that concentration in a few lines, is that 
the small country's real income is liable to wide f luctuati~ns.~~ 
It is essential to note that the static gains from trade con- 
cept implies small-country achievement of a high level of 
real income through foreign trade. The substance of our 
qualifying remarks is that a high degree of product de- 
pendence implies the possibility of a high but widely fluctu- 
ating real income. Let us dispose of one point in summary 
fashion. If one small-country alternative is non-interference 
with specialization, another is the cessation of: trade and the 
complete "insulation" of the home economy. It is presumed 
that the latter alternative is not a practical or desirable one. 
But, there are no grounds for assuming that the community 
will desire the maximum level of real income available 
through specialization regardless of possible fluctuations 
around that level. 
If it is granted that the small-country choice may be for 
future incomes that are liable to essentially unpredictable 
fluctuation, considerable light is thrown upon the role of 
policy measures in the small country. There is no possibility 
01 an actuarial approach to the future for domestic authori- 
ties. Product dependence involves uncertainty as to future 
world demand and, at best, only educated guesses can be 
made as to the wisdom of, say, diversifying the home econ- 
omy now in anticipation of a fall in world demand at some 
time in the future. It would seem that desirable policy meas- 
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ures should aim at increasing the mobility of domestic re- 
sources and encouraging the development of alternatives in 
anticipation of any severe change in the world demand for 
export specialties. Neither of these objectives is necessarily 
achieved through the impersonal operation of the price sys- 
tem, 
The present discussion cannot include detailed evaluation 
of specific policy measures in small-country situations. I t  
must be evident, however, that the conclusions of static anal- 
ysis, e.g., large gains for small countries, cannot be taken to 
apply without exception in a context of uncertainty. Conse- 
quently, the task for policy-framers in the small country is 
one of anticipating risk and uncertainty without renouncing 
the gains of specialization, The problem is not a simple one, 
nor is it insoluble, 
The discussion of cyclical and product dependence re- 
ferred to economic effects. In turning to the concept of cul- 
tural dependence, it is not possible or desirable to confine 
the discussion within such narrow bounds, although it will 
be advisable to concentrate upon economic aspects of the 
problem. Even so it is not possible here to do more than to 
indicate the importance of cultural dependence for the small 
nation, since an adequate development of the phenomenon 
would require lengthy and detailed analysis. 
At an earlier stage it was suggested that cultural de- 
pendence was evidenced by the "integration" of one nation's 
economy with that of another. International trade always 
gives rise to a mutual adaptation of productive structures.*' 
With the introduction of trade a re-allocation of resources is 
sponsored at home and abroad. Little reflection is necessary 
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to convince one that, historically, trade has also had an im- 
pact upon individual preferences, There are advantages in 
considering any trade between countries as involving a 
measure of cultural dependence. All that is implied is that 
with trade, economic activity in separate countries becomes 
to some degree interdependent, and that this economic in- 
terdependence will almost inevitably involve the nations in 
an interdependence extending to non-economic relationships. 
Cultural dependence may be viewed as a thoroughly de- 
sirable by-product of international trade. No doubt a con- 
siderable part of the appeal of free trade arguments rested 
upon the debatable presumption that the prosecution of in- 
dividual interest would necessarily lead to a cosmopolitan 
atmosphere conducive to the reIaxation of international ten- 
sions. This view may be, and has been, presented in such 
uncompromising style as to leave one suspicious that only 
an over-simplified view of the world economy could yield 
such a conclusion. Still it would not be defensible to urge 
that cultural dependence is undesirable per se, for such a 
position would imply that international trade is either un- 
desirable itself, or else that its advantages are subject to re- 
duction to the extent that any cultural dependence is in- 
volved. The fact of the matter is that cultural dependence 
may or may not be desirable depending upon the particular 
type of trading relationship which is associated with it. The 
distinction may seem pedantic and non-operational in that 
cultural dependence apparently can be one thing at one time 
and place and another thing at a different time and place. 
That, however, is precisely what we mean to contend. Any 
alternative view forces one to conclude either (a) trade al- 
ways can yield desirable results, or (b) trade never (rarely) 
yields desirable results. Unless one feels that the followers 
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of the Manchester School or the followers of Rosa Luxem- 
bourg have presented a well-rounded appraisal, some posi- 
tion between the extremes is necessary. 
Let us return to the position of the small economy, bear- 
ing in mind the view that while cultural dependence (or 
interdependence) is associated with trade, cultural depend- 
ence may or may not be viewed as desirable according to 
specific circumstances. Upon several occasions it has been 
emphasized that the small country trading internationally 
achieves a very high degree of specialization. This economic 
effect will, we now urge, typically involve a substantial de- 
gree of cultural dependence. There can be no argument but 
that a high degree of specialization involves dependence; this 
should be amply clear from the earlier discussion of cyclical 
and product dependence. But is it inevitable that the small 
country's caltural dependence will be of a higher degree than 
that of a larger nation? I t  is not inevitable that such should 
be the case, but there is a strong presumption that it may be. 
Let us take the case, once again, of a hypothetical small 
country that has specialized to the extent of concentrating 
upon a single export for sale in world markets. I t  is conceiva- 
ble that this very specialization may operate against the de- 
velopment of cultural dependence. I t  could do so where the 
specialization of production gives rise to econon~ic, political, 
and social institutions peculiarly adapted to conditions of 
production. This possibility is lessened to the extent that the 
wide range of small-country imports tends to break down 
specialized institutional arrangements and to establish in 
their place arrangements modeled after those of larger and 
more diversified nations. The problem is often one of eco- 
nomic development, While extreme degrees of domestic spe- 
cialization may work to establish certain cultural patterns, 
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forces are set up which in turn tend to break down these 
patterns. Historically it is possible to observe the co-existence 
of the new with the old, e.g., Japan of the late 19th and early 
20th centuries and many nations presently h the process of 
rapid development. The hypothesis is one which cannot be 
elaborated at this time. I t  will be noticed that it would move 
away from the concept of size and substitute in its stead a 
concept of stages in economic development. 
Let us return once more to the "pure" small-country situa- 
tion. The feature of the small-country position to which we 
wish to direct attention is that of the small nation trading 
in a world economy in which the exercise of national power 
is important. While we would not deny that cultural de- 
pendence would exist in the absence of the maximization of 
power positions, it is felt that cultural dependence is of 
somewhat more interest in the case where nations trade for 
non-economic as well as economic motives. I t  is taken for 
granted that, upon occasion, political units do conduct their 
trade on other than economic grounds. Whether or not they 
should do so is a question upon which no judgment will be 
expressed. 
The implications for the small country trading in situa- 
tions where national power is involved are quite clear. In 
such a case the large gains of small nations are symptomatic 
of a weak position from a power ~tandpoint.~' This is ap- 
parent when it is appreciated that the large (powerful) nation 
evaluates trade not only upon its economic merits but also 
upon its non-economic merits. The larger nation has, broadly 
speaking, two courses of action open to it. In the first place, 
the large nation may increase the gains to the small country 
by offering the small country better terms than an impersonal 
market mechanism would offer. In this case it might be ob- 
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served that the large country pays for value received. In the 
second place, the large country may threaten the small coun- 
try with an interruption of trade. In this case the large coun- 
try may not have to pay for value received. The weakness 
of the small-country situation is emphasized when it is real- 
ized that the large country may pursue both courses of action 
although not simultaneously with respect to a single small 
country. That is to say, the large country may first, if neces- 
sary, encourage the small country's dependence, and sub- 
sequently, with small-country alternatives reduced, proceed 
to exact a much harsher bargain. Where the large nation is 
fortunate enough (from a Machiavellian standpoint) to be 
able to face a number of small countries with "all or none" 
offers, the situation is akin to that of a single, discriminating 
purchaser in an imperfect market. I t  is hardly necessary to 
add that the stakes are rather higher than in a pureIy eco- 
nomic setting. 
It may be questioned whether or not the small-country lot 
is quite so unfavorable. Is it not possible that the small coun- 
try will be strategically located from a power standpoint 
by virtue of the importance of its specialty? This could, per- 
haps, allow the small nation some latitude in avoiding a very 
subservient role. Three comments may be made. First, the 
critical product must be one not available from alternative 
suppliers so the small-country advantage is unique. Second, 
the product must not be so critical as to expose the small 
country to direct rather than devious pressure, Third, the 
small country must not be caught between a few more pow- 
erful nations. Such an equilibrium would be precarious and 
likely to force the small nation to "'throw in" eventually with 
one or another of the power blocs. 
Particular interest is attached to the small-country situa- 
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tion where national power is at stake. In such an event, the 
exercise of national power by the large nation is capable of 
sponsoring cultural dependence of an extreme sort, This cul- 
tural dependence amounts to a calculated penetration of a 
weaker nation by a stronger one and, perhaps, is at one and 
the same time more readily evident than the more subtle 
process by which cultural dependence arises in the absence 
of the power struggle and more destructive of the existence 
of the small nation as an independent entity. Cyclical and 
product dependence may actually be of minor importance in 
such a setting in which individuals in the small country might 
look back nostalgically to a time when only economic risk 
was to be feared. 
The perfectly proper emphasis given in economic theory 
to the possibility of large gains by small nations requires 
careful interpretation in realistic situations. Some doubt has 
even been raised in our analysis as to the usefulness of a 
concept of size. Attention has been directed here to the 
small-country situation because of the special treatment ac- 
corded to trade between a large country and a small one in 
the 19th century version of international trade theory. 
Acmally the concepts of cyclical, product, and cultural 
dependence are of service in other situations. The concepts 
of dependence can be applied in the international economy 
where nations differ not in "size" but in stage of economic 
development. Nor is the application limited to the inter- 
national economy. With some modification these same types 
of dependence are faced by separate regional economies 
within a single nation. 
JOHN H. AUTEN 
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NOTES 
1. Whether or not the resource alIocation with unimpeded specializa- 
tion would achieve an optimal distribution of reaI income among 
countries depends upon: (a) the "beginning" distribution of income, 
and (b) the non-economic criterion of an optimum distribution 
that is selected. 
2. David Ricardo, The Principles of  Political Economy and Taxation, 
Sraffa Edition (Cambridge, 1951), Vol. I, p. 128. 
3. Mill attempted a consideration of stabilit conditions. See his J P~inciples of Political Economy, Peoples E ition (London, 1886), 
pp. 360-365. The effort was prompted by Thornton's criticism that 
more than one exchange ratio might clear the market. Mill's treat- 
ment of this minor issue was faulty. 
4. For a view as to the origins and significance of the small-country 
case see Jacob Viner's Studies in the Theory of International Trade 
(New York, 1937), especially pp. 448-450. A rather less charitable 
interpretation of neo-classical understanding of the implications of 
partial specialization is expressed in F. D, Graham's The Theory 
of International Valzces (Princeton, 1948), especially Chapters 11 
and XI. 
5. The reader who is prepared to accept the failure of reciprocal 
demand in the small-country case may prefer to proceed directly 
to the second paragraph on p. 13. The intervening discussion is 
not vital to the conclusions of this section. 
6. On this point, see Viner, Studies, p. 547, and T. M. Whiten, "Clas- 
sical Theory, Graham's Theory, and Linear Programming in Inter- 
national Trade," Qua7ferly Journal of  Economics, Vol. LXVII (No- 
vember, 1953), p. 525. 
7. Pure exchange refers to a situation in which production is not 
involved. 
8. This particular interpretation is a proper one only for the case of 
a single individual, e.g., an "average Englishman." When contours 
of indifference as between commodities are constructed for a 
community composed of many valuing individuals, important diffi- 
culties are obscured. Any point in the XY plane will involve some 
distribution of the commodity stock among community members. 
Conceptually one should allow for the fact that there is not one 
but an infinite number of contours passing through this point in 
order to take account of all conceivable distributions of the com- 
modity stock. The difficulty may be expressed in a slightly different 
fashion. Suppose that the community commences trade and moves 
from its original position to one on a higher indifference contour. 
Is the community better off? It would be (almost) inconceivable 
that every individual regarded himself as being better off. Typically, 
trade will involve a different distribution of income than no-trade 
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with some individuals gaining and others losing. Ways can be found 
out of this impasse but will not be detailed here. The interested 
reader is referred to: T. deScitovszky, "A Reconsideration of the 
Theory of Tariffs," Reuiew of Economic Studies, Vol. I X ,  1942, pp. 
89-110; P. A. Samuelson, "The Gains from International Trade," 
Canadian Jm~rnal  of Economics and Political Science, Vol. V, pp. 
195-205; I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics (Oxford, 
1950), Ch. XIII. The descitovszky and Samuelson articles are re- 
printed (without significant change) in Readings i n  the Theory of 
International Trade (Philadelphia, 1949). 
9. Rotation in a counter-clockwise direction traces out another branch 
of the offer curve. Only the branch drawn is needed for present 
purposes. 
10. The geometry will be subdued. The relevant branch of the offer 
curve would extend down and to the right rather than up and to 
the left as in Figure 111. 
11. In the case of Figure IV the origin is taken as the beginning com- 
modity stocks in each country. Each country could have possessed 
an initial stock of only one commodity without affecting our con- 
clusions. 
12. The reader interested in the historical development of international 
trade theory is referred to Viner, Studies. A valuable summary of 
the current s t a t ~ ~ s  of international trade theory is contained in 
Lloyd Metzler's "The Theo~y of International Trade," in A Suwey  
of Contemporaig Economics, H. Ellis (editor), (Philadelphia, 1949), 
pp. 210-254. 
13, Interestingly enough this is the one case where the impossibility 
of deriving a thoroughly satisfactory index of gain from trade is 
of no particular concern. 
14. The reader not familiar with the multiplier concept for an open 
economy will find a lucid treatment in C. P. Kindleberger, Inter- 
national Economics (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1953), Ch. 9. 
15. Kindleberger, op,  cit,, p. 169. 
16. A. 0. Hirschman, National Power and the Strtcctt~re of Foreign 
Trade (Berkeley, 1945), p. 18. 
17. A peculiar type of "competition" to ~vhich certain exports are 
lilcely to be susceptible does deserve mention. The small counhy 
that specializes in exports having a low income elasticity of 
demand (e.g., staple foodstuffs) may expect to lose relatively as 
world real incomes rise. In this case competition comes from 
goods and services of higher income elasticity as foreign con- 
sumers achieve higher standards of livinz. For the small country, 
the advisability of hastening resource transfer out of low income 
elasticity lines (certain agricultural pursuits) can be modified if 
the slzort run terms of trade are expected to be very favorable. 
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18, The statement assumes that revenues from each export commodity 
represent a substantial portion of total export revenue. 
19. This effect will vary according to the type of export. I t  would 
not change the argument if export specialization prevented 
(hindered) the domestic development of a trained labor force and 
more than the rudiments of a capital market. 
20. The discussion here has run in terms of cuts in real income. I t  
couId be modified to allow for inflationary impacts from abroad. 
21. This is even true in the theoretical case of trade between two 
nations with equal relative (but variable) costs of production where 
trade occurs on the basis of differences in tastes. See W. W. Leon- 
tief, "The Use of Indifference Curves in the Analysis of Foreign 
Trade," Readings in the Theory of International Trade (Phila- 
delphia, 1949), pp. 234-235. 
22. See Hirschman, loc. cit. and pp. 23-33. 
